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Ypenburg

Introduction

Part IV was introduced with the outline of the German plan to take the city of The Hague by surprise and force the Government and GHQ to capitulate. In order to achieve that highly ambitious plan, large airlandings had been planned at Ypenburg AFB and Valkenburg AFB as well as a smaller landing at Ockenburg auxilary AFB.

In this chapter the landing at Ypenburg will be addressed.

The defences

Ypenburg was defended by the 3rd Battalion of the 'Regiment Grenadiers', supported by two platoons of modern armoured cars. The six Landsverk armoured cars were fitted with a Bofors 3,7 cm gun and three light machineguns 7,9 mm. The cars were all stationed between the buildings along the northwest side of the field. One company of the Grenadiers including the heavy machinegun company had taken positions along the northwest and southwest side of the field. A second company had taken positions along an arcutable northwest screen faced towards the cities Delft, Rijswijk and The Hague in order to protect the base against subversive action from Fifth Columnists. A third company was held in reserve.

Ypenburg was homebase to three squadrons of the airforce. One squadron of Fokker D-XXI fighters [1st Fighter Squadron], the only available air-force squadron of Douglas 8A-N light strike planes (though serving as fighters) [3rd Field-Army Fighter Squadron] and a squadron of obsolete recce and artillery-support planes [Fokker C-V, Koolhoven FK-51 of the 2nd Recce Squadron]. The latter were parked outside the airfield, for camouflage purposes.

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M.36 Armoured car (may 1940)

The ground-to-air defences around Ypenburg were quite extended. Two batteries of heavy guns (6 off Vickers 7,5 cm), five platoons with 2 cm Oerlikon light AA guns [12 pieces total] and three platoons with heavy machineguns [together with those of the other batteries: 20 off M.25 Spandau heavy machineguns]. Considering the fact that the opposing forces would have to fly in low, the fire power of the light AA was quite considerable. Besides, the heavy machineguns of the infantry and AF'V main guns could contribute too when it came to fighting low flying aircraft.

The D-XXI and Douglas squadrons as well as the air-defences were on high alert as off 0315 hrs, according to the standing orders of the Air Defence staff. The ground forces were on alert too, with all automatic weapons manned and ammo distributed.

The opponent

Ypenburg and Ockenburg were the objectives that had to be taken by the main force of the 1st Airborne Battalion of Fallschirmjäger Regiment 2 [I./FJR2] of which only 3./FJR.2 was assigned elsewhere (Ockenburg). Afterwards IR.65 [22.LL.ID] was scheduled to land, with the bulk on Ypenburg and a single battalion on Ockenburg. Finally one-third of the air-transported division support troops and the entire division staff would land on Ypenburg. The airfield was scheduled to receive the most formidable formation of German air-transported troops of all targeted Hague airfields.

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Map of The Hague main-roads (may 1940)

The objective of the entire operation was the ambitious endeavour to capture the Royal Family and Cabinet of the country as well as seizure of the main Dutch military headquarters. Along with the airlanding troops came a specially formed taskforce [Einsatsgruppe Feldmann] that had all the information to trace people which had been designated to be arrested (1). After the airbase would have been sieged, the airbornes would seal off the airfield and city roads whereas the air-landing troops would focus on getting into the Hague soonest. Since the staff of 22.LL.ID was also scheduled to land in Ypenburg, the operation would be commanded directly by Generalleutnant Graf von Sponeck, who was the commander in charge of the entire The Hague operation as well as the division commander of 22.LL.ID. Graf von Sponeck was one of very few German Generals that was known for his critical attitude against the nazi regime. A dangerous trade in those days ...

(1) Hauptmann Adolf von Feldmann - who was scheduled to land on Ypenburg - was an Abwehr officer. His taskforce consisted of six men forming his personal staff and four squads of each one officer, one Abwehr agent and ten men. They had been tasked to find and seize the people listed on a 'hit list' [Fahndungsliste] that had been handed to them. This list did not contain members of the Governement or GHQ, but particularly people that were linked to intelligence matters, such as (suspected) spies, Dutch intelligence service agents, etc. etc. Also drawn up street-plans, lists of military HQ's, members of Government and even lists with garages (for commandeered motorisation) were found in the Abwehr and operations package. 

The reason why so much detail, including the list itself, got disclosed is that extensive paperwork on both the operation (around the Hague) and the specific mission of the Einsatzgruppe were found on the bodies of two German officers on two different locations during the morning and afternoon of the 10th [see photo of drawn up street-scheme]. These papers were copied and taken along to the UK by a Dutch intelligence service officer that had managed to escape to the UK on May the 14th. It shapes a nice insight in the fine print of the German preparations for the operation and the involvement of the German Abwehr and the German diplomatic staff in The Hague. 

The airfield defences would first be attacked by a limited bomber-force after which the airbornes would land to seize the air- and ground-defence facilities and clear the fields of remaining resistance. Just like Waalhaven, the airlanding troops would shortly after start landing divided over a number of waves.

The battle starts

At 0315 hrs the Fokker D-XXI and Douglas fighters received orders to warm up their engines. The infantry battalion had been instructed to man all positions. It must have been little after 0400 hours that the first three bombers were spotted by the air-watch posts. All Dutch airplanes immediately received orders to scramble and did so under the punishment of the first falling bomb loads. Eight fighters [one unarmed plane that was being serviced was not scrambled] and eight of the eleven Douglas pseudo-fighters scrambled successfully. The last three Douglas planes had to break off their take-off, due to the first series of bombs crossing their run-ways. But after a brief delay also these three managed to take off.

In the meantime the German Heinkel He-111 bombers continued their bombardment. They approached their target in flights of three [Kette] and dropped their 50 kg bombs mainly around the buildings and the airplane platform. The bombardment lasted - with intervals - until 0430. Meanwhile Messerschmitts Bf-110 strafed the infantry and AA machinegun positions. The infantry positions suffered little from these raids, mainly so due to the fact that the German pilots were under instructions not to damage the runways, along which most of the Dutch infantry was entrenched. Two of the six armoured cars had been damaged though and one had been left by its crew; the other one was immobilized by debris but remained occupied. The material damage that resulted from the continuous series of air assaults was not much - however the effect on the moral of the infantry men in their fragile dug outs was quite devastating. Many fled the scene; not all of them later returned.

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The Fokker D-XXI fighter (may 1940)

After the two fighter squadrons had scrambled they'd found themselves almost directly opposed by masses of German planes. He-111 bombers and Bf-110 fighter-cruisers swarmed around the twenty Dutch planes. The German transport planes containing the airbornes also joint this huge armada. Due to the tremendous German air-power the few Dutch planes were almost immediately forced into defence and found themselves dispersed across a vast air-space. The Douglas planes proved totally inapt as fighter planes, as many had feared beforehand. They didn't stand the slightest change against their fast and heavily armed adversaries. Seven of the Douglas planes were picked out of the sky within minutes, whereas two others were forced to make emergency landings. Only two Douglas planes managed to avoid destruction and landed on Ockenburg AFB [where they would also go lost due to the subsequent German landings there]. Many air crew men onboard the Douglas's perished. They only managed to take two of the invaders [2 Ju-52] with them to the ground. A dramatic result of a very ill decision up in the upper command tree to utilise these very capable light strike planes as fighters.

The highly manoeuvrable Fokker D-XXI fighters were able to put up much more of a fight. They faced the Bf-110's in a number of dog-fights in which the Fokker's easily outmanoeuvred their bigger opponents. Only one D-XXI was actually shot down in a dog-fight. Two were forced into a crash landing after emptying their ammo-stocks, not being able to find a Dutch held airfield. The other planes made emergency landings all over the place due to empty fuel-tanks or landed at Ockenburg [the one plane that landed here was lost due to the German landing there]. The German seizure of all Hague airfields obviously played a major role in the forced emergency landings of the Dutch fighters.

The eight Fokker's shot down only four [confirmed] enemy planes [1 Ju-52, 1 Bf-109, 1 Do-17 and 1 He-111]. Six of the eight D-XXI had been lost due to emergency landings, one had crashed. A heavy blow to the airforce fighter force. The contribution of the Douglas planes had been a mere two Ju-52, against a loss of all eleven Douglas. The Fokker C-V planes, that had remained on the ground - parked outside the actual airfield premises - would later be joining another unit and contribute to the ongoing air-operations of the small Dutch airforce.

The landings proceed

The hell that the infantry men, of the company on the field itself, had found themselves in was left by many of them when the ordeal of exploding bombs and buzzing bullets came over them. The officers had to do their utmost to prevent a total chaos of fleeing men. They managed to get the majority back behind their weapons before the German airbornes started landing [about 0435-0440 hrs].

Three airborne companies and a battalion staff were scheduled to land around Ypenburg. These about 430 men had orders to seize the airfield and take care of its defence systems. According to an airborne battle-report three [loaded] planes crashed due to direct hits by AAA, and many airbornes got hit yet inside the planes from Dutch machinegun fire during their brief decent. The report furthermore states that out of their 53 planes [a full Gruppe] only 27 made it back. The heavy ground-to-air fire was the reason that the airborne drop nearly failed in its roots.

The airbornes hit the ground over a stretched area that dispersed them between Overschie, Rijswijk, Delft, Nootdorp and Pijnacker: a room of three km depth and two-and-a-half km width. Their assignment to take out the airfield's defences was therefore hardly feasible, although some defences had indeed been taken out prior to the first airlandings [at 0515 hrs].

Due to this failure to round up the immediate airfield defences, the first nine Ju-52 transport planes landed straight into a deadly cone of fire coming from the northwest and southwest defence positions as well as the 2 cm AA platoons at Delft. Three of the armoured cars - with their 37 mm guns - were able to join the defence fire. Most of the planes were simply riddled by bullets and shrapnel, some caught fire before touch down. A considerable share of men on board these planes were killed instantly [after the battle a shocking high number of burnt corpses was recovered]. Survivors of this first wave would later confirm the genuine hell amongst the troops on board.

The second wave - that landed about fifteen minutes later - shared more or less the fate of the first. The consequantial inferno of [14] burning planes on the landing strip prevented many Ju-52's of the third wave of flying in. They diverted to (blocked) roads, fields and stretches of land nearby or other suitable landing grounds around Ypenburg and Delft. The fourth wave diverted to Ockenburg and to the dunes of Kuikduin.

Planes that came even later also found Ypenburg [and later Ockenburg] AFB obstructed and landed at alternative locations too. Some as far off as Rotterdam or Hook of Holland. In itself this was a tactical defensive success, but the dispersed landing of German airbornes and airlanding troops sculpted a picture at the staff tables of an intentional overwhelming airlanding operation in the entire region around The Hague! Only in retrospect we know that these planes [about 200 for the Hague region] had all been intended for the three airfields around The Hague only. at the contempory staff tables they caused so much disturbance and (unnecessary) counter measures, that the failed German operation could almost be seen as a strategic success.

A fortune to the Germans was that the staff of 22.(LL)ID, that had been scheduled to land on Ypenburg, was able to divert to Ockenburg, including Generalleutnant Graf von Sponeck. Should they have landed on or around Ypenburg, changes would have been considerable that the division staff had been killed, wounded or captured. Since the days to follow would proof the importance of the divisional commander being around, one could say that the Germans were very fortunate that the division staff had survived.

The battle on the ground

The battle on the ground had meanwhile started to develop into a series of very intensive engagements between the airbornes and the remaining defenders. Northeast of Ypenburg the airbornes were denied access by the combination of some heavy machineguns and a platoon of motorized hussars that were part of the armoured car squadron. To the northwest a similar development. Also there machineguns prevented the Germans from a successful approach of the airfield.

North of the airfield the Germans gained more success, not the least due to the fact that they had managed to re-group quite a concentration of the dispersed airborne force there. The Dutch defenders, joint by the crew of an AAA battery that had suffered a direct bomb hit, had to retreat, which gave the Germans the opportunity to deploy their troops along the canal [de Vliet] on the southern side of The Hague. But freshly arriving Dutch reinforcements from The Hague had joint forces with some of the retreated occupation of the northern flank [parts of the shielding company] and they managed to deny the Germans a crossing of the canal and, more importantly, tied the Germans to their positions.

The most successful German action took place on the westside of the airbase. At this location a company of airbornes had landed in between the airfield and the rear of the screen-defences where a part of the shielding company of the Grenadiers had been positioned. As such the airbornes only faced the back of both the company stationed on the field itself and the one facing the city-side. In this sector many Dutch positions were taken in force and a considerable number of Dutch was either killed or taken prisoner.

The few Germans that had landed west of De Vliet canal were quickly eliminated. The screen forces had however almost ceased to exist in this area, with exception of the men that managed to stand ground around the Hoornbrug [bridge over a narrow stream called De Vliet]. The fights lasted so long that the airbornes had not been able to take care of the airfield defences yet and as such they witnessed the defeat of their airlanding comrades - flying in under heavy fire - without any chance of assisting them.

When the airbornes had taken such positions that Dutch forces in Rijswijk seemed to be sealed off, they reorganised and advanced onto the airfield, in order to prevent a repetition of the previously witnessed defeat of their air-landing comrades. At this stage their officers authorized them to break the international code of conduct on the battlefield. Dutch POW's were used as living shields behind which the airbornes advanced towards the remaining Dutch defences at the northwest side of the airbase. The defenders got confused by this unorthodox method and many were taken prisoner as a result, whilst others made a run for it. The airbornes even managed to force an armoured car [the one that had been immobilised due to bomb craters and debris around the car] crew to surrender. Hereafter the main-building of the base was occupied by the airbornes and soon after the notorious swastika flag swung from a window.

The Germans stopped

One group of defenders was able to withstand all German assaults and hold out. This group - mainly comprising the previously mentioned motorized hussars - held a position in the northeastern corner of the airfield. The airbornes were not able to overrun this position, decided to leave it aside and shifted their attention to the southwest instead. Along that side of the field they managed to take position by position by force. It didn't take them a lot of time to eventually force all the positions along this end of the base into surrender. All POW's were then concentrated in the occupied main-building on the north side of the base. The base was by then practically in German hands. Three of the armoured cars managed to escape however. Two of them drove to the Hoornbrug and joint the defences there.

At the Hoornbrug - the access to Rijswijk and the Hague - a firm Dutch stronghold had been constructed by a number of troops under a few proactive officers. Many troops from all kinds of units had been assembled here and put back into shape again. Also, some reinforcements from recruit units from Delft had arrived. The airbornes realised that the Hoornbrug was of strategic importance should they still desire to stand any chance of entering The Hague. They concentrated a considerable force and subsequently tried to overrun the bridge defences, but in vain. Germans that endeavoured to cross the canal elsewhere were killed or forced back and some [requisitioned] cars and motorbikes used to force a crossing were destroyed by heavy machinegun fire. Two of the Luftwaffe fighters that attacked the Dutch soldiers along the canal were shot down by the Delft ground-to-air defences.

The German operation at Ypenburg had then reached the peak of its (initial) success. Almost the entire airfield was in their hands, with exception of the one position in the far northern corner. From then onwards their situation would rapidly grow into a very delicate one. Due to the failed airlandings hardly any reinforcements arrived whereas the airborne losses had piled up. Besides, the Dutch had managed to seal off the airfield on the outside and isolated many pockets of resistance that were eventually all forced into surrender.

Nevertheless, the dispersed German force did create the challenge of a considerable German presence in the entire region around Ypenburg and between Delft and Rotterdam. Countless planes had landed in meadows in the region, in Pijnacker, Nootdorp, Delft, Overschie and along the (obstructed) highway from The Hague to Rotterdam. Many of the troops onboard these planes were able to disembark in one piece. On the other hand, almost all their officers had been killed and as such sometimes medical officers had to operate as troop commanders. The highest in rank who did survive the landings was Oberst Friemel [Commander of IR.65]. The maximum envelop of the German bridgehead had been reached some hours after the first landing. It comprised nearly the entire airfield, the eastbank of the canal De Vliet from Voorburg up to Delft and a small zone between Rijswijk en Delft.

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The retaking of Ypenburg (may 1940)

Delft itself had faced enemy landings in all corners around the city. The garrison commander had not immediately recognized that the primary objective of these airbornes was the airfield east of the city. Besides, the number of troops under his command was modest. Only a weak depot battalion of infantry, a number of much smaller units and five light AA platoons resided under his command. The largest single concentration of airbornes [about 60] assembled around a factory south of Delft along the canal. Later about 400-500 men airlanding troops managed to reassemble outside Delft too. They had survived the landings of about 35 planes south of Delft. This entire force was commanded by a senior medical officer. No other senior officer had survived [or was too badly wounded] the landings and following fights.

The entire south-front of Delft was defended by two companies of recruits. All German attempts to penetrate the city were rejected by these men of whom some were still dressed in half their uniforms or even night-wear. The opposing German troops later assembled at a factory near the canal. A few sent out Dutch patrols managed to eliminate a considerable number of stray German units around Delft. Around Nootdorp and the northeast of Ypenburg many Germans were killed or taken prisoner by some aggressive Dutch patrols too. At the end or the morning 135 Germans had been taken prisoner, about 100 had been killed, many more were wounded. The German units that had landed south of Delft had been isolated from their comrades at Ypenburg. The commanding medical-officer [Division Chief Medical Officer Lt-Col Wischhusen] noted that his men were badly shaken by the events of the day and he had to dedicate all of his time to keep them in position. They suffered from the constant Dutch fire and moral was below zero amongst these men. Isolated as they were, they would remain in their position until night-fall.

Ypenburg retaken

We move back in time a little. It was already addressed that during the morning [around 0900] the German bridgehead had reached its maximum size. From then onwards the Dutch would regain ground on their adversary.

It all started at Voorburg, where the Germans had overrun a heavy AAA battery in the early hours. This was the most northern edge of their bridgehead. Centre point of attention was a huge mansion [Huize Dorrepaal] that was situated close to De Vliet canal. Quite a number of airbornes had taken positions here and controlled one of the small bridges from this point. At 1000 hours a young 2nd Lieutenant appeared, named Maduro (2). He organised the defences and quickly planned an assault on the German position.

(2) 2nd Lieutenant Maduro originated from the Netherlands Antilles. He was a promising young officer that showed his courage during the fighting of May the 10th. During the occupation of the Netherlands he became active in the resistance movement from the very beginning. When he was eventually caught by the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) he was deported to the German model camp Dachau, a school camp for SS guards, where the regime was more than inhumane. The young Lieutenant persished in this hell-hole in 1945. After the war he was decorated with the MWO - the highest Dutch order for valour - and a well-known tourist attraction in the Hague was called after him: the miniature town Madurodam.

Under cover of a machinegun and an AT-gun the Lieutenant stormed over the bridge - followed by his men - and managed to reach the mansion in one piece. His men entered the building and cleared it room by room, while the AT gun and MG's supressed German positions. The occupying Germans surrendered. The action was followed by a clean sweep of the entire park surrounding the mansion, which resulted in the capture of another 70 airbornes. The nearby mansion Zeerust was also cleared from its hostile occupation and this resulted in yet another 20 POW's. These series of actions - mostly initiated and commanded by the young Lieutenant - resulted in the mopping-up of the entire German stronghold in the north. The Lieutenant was [posthumously - see note 2] awarded the MWO after the war for is valour and leadership.

The first direct counter action against the German occupation of the airforce base itself started at de Hoornbrug in Rijswijk. Under covering fire from machineguns one company of recruits stormed over the bridge and moved forward under the terrible handgun fire of probably a full company of airbornes. They miraculously managed to reach a point within 250 metre of the airfield, but then they had to take cover, because the German fire had become so dense that every further inch of movement would definitely have killed them. German MG's surrounded them and pinned the recruits down in their open field positions. Also German fighter-planes dove down to strafe their open positions.

Simultaneous with this first company another company of the Grenadiers had worked its way forward. These men managed to approach the farm-house [Johannahoeve] to the north of the field [by then the most northern point of the German defences] that had been strongly fortified by the airbornes. They managed to come within a few hundred meters of this object but then also these men had to take cover due to the dense German fire.

Although both company actions had ended in a stand-off up to that point, the most devious Dutch counteraction was still ahead. Three batteries of field artillery [7,5 cm] had been deployed to shell the German strongholds on and around the airfield with direct fire. The plan was that after these guns would cease fire, two small companies would form an assaulting force east of the highway [running southwest to northeast] and one company west of the highway. When these three units went forward they were however soon pinned down by intensive German machinegun fire and close air support from a number of Messerschmitts.

But then the artillery started whistling its tune again. Numerous grenades buzzed over the heads of the covering companies in the open field and dropped right onto the German positions on the airfield. Shortly after German occupied buildings were set ablaze or shot to rubble. The airbornes quickly evacuated the buildings and made a run for the fortified buildings and farms outside the field. The pinned down company of recruits was by then able to crawl forward onto the actual airfield. Many Germans, who realized the pointlessness of further resistance, stuck up their hands, surrendering to the Dutch infantry. These features had a devastating effect on others and caused the entire German defence to collapse. The Grenadier company alone took 123 POW's. Suddenly a Dutch officer came rushing on and ordered all Dutch soldiers to quickly evacuate the field! A British air assault was expected. Indeed - at 1510 hrs a few Blenheim light bombers started bombing Ypenburg. After the raid the airfield was quickly re-occupied by the Dutch. By then only two main resistance pockets remained: two farm-houses [Johannahoeve and Hoeve Loos] close to the base, which had meanwhile been built-out by the airbornes.

Hoeve Loos was taken after an assault at 1730 hours. The Germans swiftly surrendered after a section of heavy machineguns had opened fire and strained the building. An assaulting party had approached the German position under cover of the MG fire. 42 POW's were made, ten Germans had been killed. The farm house Johannahoeve proved much more of a challenge. At first the Dutch tried to persuade the occupation to surrender by pounding the strong building full of holes by means of dense machinegun fire. All available machineguns riddled the structure. Still the stubborn airbornes did not give way. A Dutch infantry storm-assault was rebuffed after the death of some attackers, including the leading Lieutenant. Then artillery was finally incorporated in the plans. Twenty 7,5 cm grenades were pumped into the building, after which the airbornes finally came out.  The brave occupation of about 40 men had suffered 4 KIA and 6 WIA. The remaining 30 men became POW's for the rest of the war.

Aftermath

After the airfield had been retaken, the remaining German resistance around the field had to be overcome. At many different locations small groups of airbornes or even individuals had still maintained positions in deserted Dutch trenches or bomb craters. After some time - and sometimes intensive local skirmishes - these last German forces [about 65 men] around Ypenburg were forced to surrender. Amongst them the wounded commander of KGzbV12 - Hauptmann Freiherr von Hornstein - who's Ju-52 had been responsible for the airlanding at Ypenburg. He would be one of the few lucky POW's who would not be evacuated to England at the 13th or 14th due to his severe wounds.

Also the east side of Delft was cleared from almost the entire German occupation. The enemy resistance along De Vliet was systematically mopped-up too. In total 150 airbornes and airlanding troops were taken prisoner here, amongst whom the airborne battalion commander, Hauptmann Noster.

Still some hundreds of mainly airlanding troops had escaped surrender and were still hiding in the fields and buildings between Delft and Rotterdam.

Balance

The battle for Ypenburg had ended. It turned out to be an overwhelming tactical victory for the Dutch, and a quite dramatic and bloody loss for the Germans.

In total the Dutch had lost 51 men KIA at Ypenburg itself, and 43 KIA in the area around the base. The German losses exceeded that number by far. Over 130 registered KIA, around 500 WIA and at Ypenburg itself 720 men had become POW. In the surrounding area [Delft, Nootdorp, Pijnacker, Bleiswijk] another 575 were taken prisoner. In other words, 1,300 men POW, about 650 killed and wounded.

Many POW's would later be transported to England [around 1,250 in total]. This contributed considerably to the heavy permanent loss suffered by the Germans at Ypenburg. Also in the German journals the battle at Ypenburg was considered a hard felt defeat. A unique defeat in the entire Westfeldzug of May and June 1940, and hardly known to anyone outside the Netherlands.

Some additional "famous last words" about the German defeat are required though. Although the Germans were very much aware of this total defeat at Ypenburg, their official reports stated that they were outmatched by superior well-trained forces and artillery to which they had no defence. That was obviously untrue, in particular in the first stage of the battle.

The backbone of the Dutch forces that held the defence along the canal and that later retook Ypenburg was formed by recruits from the depots in Delft and The Hague. Some of these men had been enlisted for only a mere four days before the invasion! The two companies of Grenadiers on the field and in the outer screen defences had been overrun by the airbornes during the first two hours of the battle. Artillery got only involved when the buildings of the airfield were retaken and the Johannahoeve resistance had to be broken.

In other words, the Germans exaggerated a little, and so did the Dutch who lifted the victory beyond the actual modest meaning it had. Moreover, the victory was facilitated by a very bold German plan that had failed as off the very first phase of execution. The Germans had clearly underestimated the devastating effect of the ground-to-air defences and when the airborne landing was messed up, the whole operation started off on the wrong foot. When the air-landing troops subsequentially landed on a still well defended airfield and as such shot to pieces, the recipy for failure was almost complete.

The Dutch victory at Ypenburg was obviously one of very few events that could be looked back on as a sweet revenge. It mattered only little to none as to the final outcome. And moreover, the lessons learnt would go into the German text-books and ... were totally missed by the Allies.