Before proceeding with the events of 15 May, it is worthwhile to briefly reassess the defensive qualities of the Bath Line.
Running through the hamlets of Bath and Rilland, the line sealed off the eastern approaches to Zuid-Beveland, a bottle-neck shaped narrow. Its purpose was not to provide a decisive defensive position, but rather to delay an advancing enemy long enough for the main defensive line at Zanddijk to prepare for battle. This rationale was somewhat questionable, as both lines lay well within Dutch territory and the defenders of the Zanddijk Line would almost certainly have sufficient warning of any German advance. In practice, the Bath Line was intended as little more than a holding position and an obstacle to slow the enemy's progress.
Reflecting this limited role, the line was only lightly fortified. Its principal features consisted of trenches reinforced with sand and timber, supplemented by a small number of steel reinforced-concrete casemates positioned to cover key roads and causeways. Three modern 4,7 cm anti-tank guns and two light infantry guns guarded the main approaches.
The surrounding terrain enhanced the defensive value of the position. Large areas in front of the line had been deliberately flooded, restricting movement and channelling any attack towards a handful of viable approach routes. In practice, an attacker could advance only along the raised causeways and the elevated railway embankment that crossed the flooded landscape.
The line itself was manned by some 400 soldiers of the 14th Border Infantry Battalion. Their firepower was modest. The battalion possessed fewer than two dozen light machine guns and only six heavy machine guns, most of which were installed in the twelve available casemates.
The greatest weakness of the Bath Line was its lack of artillery support. No field artillery or anti-aircraft batteries were assigned to the position. Any artillery assistance would have to come from naval units operating in the Scheldt estuary. In particular, the Dutch gunboat Hr.Ms. Flores, armed with three 150 mm guns, was available to provide fire support on request. Allied destroyers could also contribute if circumstances allowed.
In reality, however, naval support was far from guaranteed. Coordination arrangements had been established primarily with Dutch naval units, and with the earlier loss of Hr.Ms. Johan Maurits van Nassau, the Flores remained the only dedicated Dutch naval artillery platform immediately available to support the defenders of the Bath Line. Consequently, the position depended heavily upon a small infantry force occupying a lightly fortified obstacle line, with limited firepower and only uncertain access to supporting artillery.
Against a determined attack by a modern combined-arms force, the Bath Line could not have been expected to hold for long. Its true value lay in forcing an attacker to deploy, reconnoitre, and advance cautiously through a restricted frontage, thereby buying precious time for the stronger defences further west on Zuid-Beveland.
During the afternoon of 14 May, disheartened French troops began to appear at several of the roadblocks along the Bath Line. The Dutch defenders watched with astonishment as their formidable ally - whose professionalism, modern equipment, and mechanised columns had made such a strong impression only days earlier (1) - returned from the battlefield in a state of exhaustion and defeat. The French soldiers who could communicate with their Dutch counterparts spoke of being overwhelmed by a powerful and relentless enemy. For many defenders of the Bath Line, whatever courage remained was severely shaken by these accounts.
(1) It should be noted, however, that the French divisions assigned to the defence of Walcheren - the 60th and 68th Infantry Divisions - were by no means elite formations. On the contrary. They consisted largely of older reservists equipped with reserve matériel, much of it dating from the First World War or even earlier. Motor transport was scarce, and their overall strength and equipment were not superior to those of the Dutch units. The French troops that had impressed the defenders of the Bath Line during the previous days had primarily belonged to the mechanised and motorised formations under Colonel De Beauchesne, which were part of the mechanized divions 1.DLM and the motorised infantry division 25.DIM. These units represented some of the best-equipped elements available to the French Army and had created an impression that was not necessarily representative of the French forces as a whole.
With the flow of retreating Dutch and French troops from the east now largely at an end, the defenders concluded that it was time to close the final approaches through the line. Additional mines were laid along the roads, sealing the remaining access routes. Warning signs marking the minefields were removed, and reconnaissance patrols were dispatched to establish the location of the advancing Germans. Most of these patrols returned with reports confirming that enemy forces were now operating nearby.
As darkness approached, a five-man patrol was sent out along the railway line. This time, however, the patrol failed to return. The sound of distant gunfire caused immediate concern among the men in the trenches. It later emerged that the patrol had encountered a German unit and that its commander, a sergeant, had been killed. He would ultimately prove to be one of only two soldiers killed by direct German action during the defence of the Bath Line.
At approximately 1730 hours, the commander of the 14th Border Infantry Battalion summoned his company commanders to his command post for a conference. The officers had only just arrived when the first shells from German artillery began to fall on the Bath Line. The distant rumble of the bombardment rolled across the flooded landscape, announcing the beginning of the battle that everyone had expected for days.
Recognising that events were now overtaking any further discussion, the battalion commander immediately sent his officers back to their respective sectors. Before they departed, he instructed them to hold their positions, maintain regular telephone contact, and report on developments as they unfolded. Wishing them good luck, he watched them return to their commands. The long wait was over. The Battle of the Bath Line had begun..
The lieutenant commanding the central company hurried back to his command post and observed the German artillery barrage bursting over the defensive line. Fortunately for the defenders, the shellfire was poorly adjusted. Most rounds fell either short of the positions or beyond them, and not a single shell detonated directly on or immediately above the trenches.
The other two company commanders, both captains, failed to return promptly to their sectors. Reluctant to move forward under the artillery bombardment, they remained behind despite repeated instructions from the battalion commander. When they eventually returned, the damage had already been done.
In the northern sector, a near miss at an anti-tank gun position wounded several soldiers. Although the incident caused only limited casualties, it proved sufficient to trigger panic among the troops. Faced with an uncertain situation and lacking firm leadership, large numbers of soldiers abandoned their positions. The flight of one group quickly influenced neighbouring units, and the panic spread through much of the northern sector.
The commander of the southern company performed no better. Shortly after reaching his command post, he telephoned battalion headquarters to report that German troops had already landed in his rear area. The report was entirely unfounded. After receiving a sharp correction from the battalion commander, he abruptly ended the conversation. Rather than restoring order, he proceeded to evacuate part of his company by boat on his own initiative.
As a consequence of these two remarkable failures in leadership, the Bath Line was largely abandoned during the evening. Only parts of the central sector remained occupied, together with the crews manning the ferro-concrete machine-gun casemates.
The casemate garrisons had not participated in the retreat, largely because they were unaware of the developments unfolding elsewhere along the line. Remaining at their posts, they continued to perform their duties. It was their determination that prevented the Bath Line from collapsing completely that same evening.
When German reconnaissance patrols began probing the position, they were met by accurate and determined machine-gun fire from the remaining Dutch strongpoints. The resistance proved sufficient to halt further advances for the time being. One soldier of 6./SS-Deutschland was killed during these encounters. The Germans themselves concluded that the artillery bombardment had failed to secure the position and that the defenders still retained significant fighting capability.
As darkness fell, the German artillery fire gradually diminished in intensity before finally ceasing altogether. Along the Bath Line, in the positions that were still occupied, confusion and uncertainty prevailed. Although much of the infantry had withdrawn, enough defenders remained in place to convince the Germans that the position was still intact. The decisive test of the line was yet to come.
In reality, only a relatively small German artillery force had participated in the bombardment of the Bath Line. The shelling was carried out by three batteries of 105 mm guns and a single battery of 150 mm artillery. At no point did the intensity of the fire exceed what would normally be regarded as harassing fire. Yet even this limited bombardment proved sufficient to trigger the collapse of much of the defence. With the exception of a few sections in the central sector under the command of the aforementioned lieutenant and the crews of the machine-gun casemates, virtually the entire battalion abandoned its positions. Remarkably, the bombardment and the preluding patrol action had caused only two fatalities.
The German artillery fire had not been intended to destroy the position, but rather to test whether the line was still occupied and capable of resistance. At that stage, the Germans had only the 2nd Battalion of the SS Regiment Deutschland available for operations against the Bath Line. Reconnaissance patrols sent forward after the bombardment returned with reports that the position remained defended. Based on these findings, the Germans began preparing a deliberate assault for the morning of 15 May.
Meanwhile, the Dutch commander of the 38th Infantry Regiment, responsible for the defence of the Bath Line, realised that the position could no longer be held with the handful of troops who had remained at their posts. At 2000 hours, orders were issued to evacuate the line and withdraw the remaining defenders.
The events of the evening demonstrated the fragility of the Bath Line's defence. Faced with only limited artillery pressure, much of the garrison had abandoned its positions before the enemy had launched a serious attack. By any objective military standard, the performance of the majority of the defenders was disappointing.