13 May marked the fourth day of the German invasion and would later come to be seen as the beginning of the end for the Dutch campaign. The French refusal to provide substantial support for the recapture of the Moerdijk bridges effectively sealed the fate of the Netherlands. In reality, however, the implications extended far beyond the Dutch theatre alone.
As long as the Moerdijk-bridges remained in German hands, the German command had little reason to alter its operational plans. Had the Allies succeeded in retaking these bridges, the Germans would almost certainly have been compelled to redeploy forces from the southern front to the central Dutch sector. Without control of the bridges, they would have lost their most effective means of crossing the major waterways that protected Fortress Holland.
Such a development might have bought the French valuable time. It would almost certainly have slowed German operations in the south and could have reduced the pressure exerted by German formations against French positions further north. Yet the opposite outcome was also conceivable. The German High Command may well have regarded the Dutch campaign as all but won and left its completion to a slightly reinforced X Army Corps (X. Armeekorps). In that scenario, the entire XXVI Army Corps (XXVI. Armeekorps), rather than only part of it, could have been directed against the French. Such a concentration of force might have posed a serious threat to the French defensive disposition.
It is therefore possible that French planners had already recognised this risk and that it influenced their decision not to undertake a major effort to assist the Dutch in recapturing Moerdijk. If so, they never communicated these considerations to their Dutch allies. On the contrary, they allowed the Dutch command to believe that meaningful assistance would be forthcoming.
By the third day of the invasion (12 May), the Germans had reached the perimeter of Fortress Holland exactly in accordance with their operational plan and timetable. Late in the afternoon of the previous day, the first reconnaissance elements of the 9th Panzer Division had crossed the Moerdijk bridges and entered the Island of Dordrecht. In the early hours of 13 May, the division's first tanks arrived south of the bridges, encountering no opposition from French armoured forces. Their immediate objective was to advance towards Rotterdam and relieve the encircled German airborne troops, but before this could be undertaken, the substantial German force assembled in North Brabant was reorganised into three separate formations: two army corps and an independent task force.
The newly established XXXIX Army Corps (mot.), under General Rudolf Schmidt, was activated on the morning of 13 May in accordance with pre-war planning. It consisted of the 9th Panzer Division, the 254th Infantry Division, the SS Regiment Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, and the remnants of the 7th Air Division's air-landing forces. At the same time, XXVI Army Corps, under General Albert Wodrig, was reorganised to comprise the main body of the SS-Verfügungsdivision - two SS infantry regiments, the divisional reconnaissance battalion and artillery regiment, together with supporting troops - as well as the 256th Infantry Division and the 208th and 225th Infantry Divisions drawn from Army Group B reserves.
The force assigned the mission of seizing the principal islands of Zeeland and advancing as rapidly as possible to the coast of Walcheren became known as Task Force 'Steiner'. It was built around the SS Regiment Deutschland, commanded by Standartenführer (Colonel) Felix Steiner, and reinforced with engineers, assault pioneers, artillery, and various supporting units. In total, the formation numbered no more than 7,000 men. Overall command remained with the commander of the SS Verfügungsdivision, General (Gruppenführer) Paul Hausser, while operational control of the task force rested with Steiner himself.
The three formations were assigned distinct operational objectives. Breda served as the pivot point from which they would diverge. XXXIX Army Corps was to advance northward towards Fortress Holland while securing the area south and southwest of Moerdijk. XXVI Army Corps was directed southward towards Belgium, the Antwerp region. Task Force Steiner was ordered to push westward through Zeeland to the North Sea coast at Walcheren.
The latter two formations shared a common strategic purpose: operations against the Antwerp region and the seizure of the maritime approaches to that vital port (the river Scheldt and the estuary called Western Scheldt). XXVI Army Corps was tasked with establishing a front facing Antwerp, protecting the right flank of the adjacent German Sixth Army, and eliminating French forces north of the city. Task Force Steiner, in turn, was to secure Walcheren and thereby protect the right flank of XXVI Army Corps while assisting in the closure of the Scheldt estuary.
On 13 May, control of the Antwerp region remained an objective of the highest strategic importance to all belligerents. Its possession would not only influence operations in Belgium and the Netherlands, but also determine access to one of north-western Europe's most important ports and lines of communication.
The French, too, had begun to reshuffle their cards, as briefly noted in the introduction. The dramatic deterioration of the strategic situation in the north, brought about by the collapse of both the Belgian and Dutch forward defences, forced the French High Command to revise its plans. A forward defence could no longer be maintained, and the foundations of the so-called Hypothèse Breda had effectively been swept away.
The strategic rationale behind Hypothèse Breda had been to secure the area east of Breda and Turnhout, enabling the French Army to establish a strong defensive position from which a counter-offensive south of the Meuse could eventually be launched into Germany's industrial Ruhr region. However, once the Dutch Peel-Raam Line and, more importantly, the Belgian defences along the Albert Canal had been breached, German forces poured into the widening gap between the Albert Canal and the Meuse. Under these circumstances, the French could no longer maintain their forward positions without risking the encirclement of substantial forces. Moreover, they lacked sufficient armoured reserves to mount effective counter-attacks against the exposed German flanks. As a result, Hypothèse Breda was gradually abandoned.
In response to this revised strategic outlook, the headquarters of the French Seventh Army issued a new directive to its subordinate commanders, designated Instruction Particulière No. 15. This order entailed a limited redeployment of the 60th and 68th Infantry Divisions. The primary mission of the 68th Division now became the defence of Walcheren, while the 60th Division was required to disperse its forces across Zuid-Beveland and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.
The previously envisaged robust defence of the Breda region was abandoned. French formations that had advanced into the Netherlands were ordered to withdraw onto Belgian territory, leaving behind only a thin screen of covering forces. This marked a significant reduction in French commitments within the Dutch theatre and reflected the growing priority accorded to developments further south and east.
In the south-western Netherlands, German forces had almost reached Zeeland. Although the Germans did not yet appear particularly eager to press their advance westward, French forces around Breda and further west were increasingly confronted by German reconnaissance elements. In practice, however, 13 May would provide the French with a brief respite.
The French quickly organised an improvised forward defence around Woensdrecht and Bergen op Zoom, the last remaining land connection between the forces in Zeeland and the main French formations to the south. Should these two towns fall into German hands, the defence of Antwerp would be placed in grave jeopardy. From positions in the area, German artillery would be able to threaten Antwerp directly and exercise control over the Scheldt approaches. Moreover, the Germans would effectively drive a wedge between the French forces stationed in Zeeland and those deployed south of the estuary.
At the same time, French divisions began withdrawing onto Belgian territory in accordance with the revised operational plan of General Giraud. Formations that had only recently rushed northward were now ordered to retrace their steps with equal urgency. The entire disposition of the Seventh Army underwent yet another major reorganisation.
Many of the units that had advanced furthest into the Netherlands found themselves poorly positioned to execute a rapid withdrawal. Some became severely congested in the narrow corridor between Antwerp and the south-western Netherlands, where limited roads and heavy traffic complicated movement. As a result, the French deployment on 13 and 14 May became increasingly disjointed and vulnerable. The disruption caused a significant loss of cohesion, combat effectiveness, and firepower. The consequences of this situation would become painfully evident during the fighting of 14 May.