During the previous day, 15 May, Zeeland's entire prepared defensive system had collapsed before the advance of the SS troops as though it had scarcely existed. This outcome was not so much the result of overwhelming German superiority as it was an embarrassing display of incompetence on the part of the Dutch defenders. Even allowing for the mitigating circumstances - poor morale following the capitulation of the main Dutch army and the generally limited combat readiness of the older reservists who manned the positions - the negligible resistance offered in both the Bath Line and the Zanddijk Line had been deeply disappointing.
As a result, the Germans now stood at the gates of Walcheren. Two SS battalions had taken up positions opposite the predominantly French forces defending the canal that bisected the centre of the Zuid-Beveland peninsula.
Following their rapid advance through the Dutch defensive lines on 15 May, the SS formations under SS Oberführer Felix Steiner halted along the Zuid-Beveland Canal. The 1st Battalion of SS Regiment Deutschland occupied the northern sector, while the 3rd Battalion deployed opposite the 'Postbrug' (bridge) in the central sector. The 2nd Battalion secured the southern flank of the recently captured territory.
The battalions were supported by several batteries of 105 mm artillery, a battery of 150 mm howitzers, engineer detachments, and anti-aircraft units. Altogether, the German force numbered approximately 2,000 men.
Facing them was a mixed French force. Along the northern coastline west of the canal, two battalions were deployed in anticipation of a possible amphibious landing - a reflection of General Durand's persistent concerns regarding German seaborne operations. The right flank was held by a battalion of the 271st Infantry Regiment, while a battalion of the 224th Infantry Regiment occupied positions further to the west.
Along the canal itself, the remaining two battalions of the 271st Infantry Regiment formed the main line of defence. They were supported by two battalions of 75 mm field artillery from the 307th Artillery Regiment. The northern battalion defended the 'Bonzijbrug'(bridge) and the 'Postbrug', both of which had been demolished by Dutch engineers, although they remained passable to individual soldiers. The nearby sluice complex had been left intact. A similar situation existed in the south, where the sluice at Hansweert had also been spared. Destroying these installations would have caused extensive flooding and severe disruption to the local landscape.
Between these two sectors stretched a long central section of canal devoid of permanent crossings, apart from an unguarded ferry point. It remains unclear whether the French maintained regular patrols in this area, but available evidence suggests that they did not. This oversight would prove costly, allowing German infiltration parties to cross the canal under cover of darkness and penetrate deep into the French rear areas.
Behind the canal, around the village of Kapelle, were stationed two Dutch companies of III-38 RI, together with Dutch artillery units equipped with twelve obsolete Krupp 84 mm 8-staal guns, twelve moderately modern Krupp 75 mm field guns, and two Krupp 105 mm field guns. A battery of Dutch Vickers heavy anti-aircraft guns and a French light anti-aircraft battery were also available. Although these Dutch units were present in the area, the canal defence itself was considered an entirely French responsibility.
Further southwest, two Dutch battalions guarded the southern coastline of Zuid-Beveland. They were too distant from the impending battle to play a significant role. The same applied to the remnants of the Dutch 14th Border Infantry Battalion, whose earlier performance at the Bath Line had done little to inspire confidence.
French Colonel Guihard commanded the defence from his headquarters in Goes, some distance behind the front. The headquarters of the 271st Infantry Regiment under Commandant (Major) Périer was located at Kapelle, as was the 68th Reconnaissance Group. Kapelle was the main municipality to the west of the canal and formed the most inportant intersection on that side. In total, the French had roughly 3,000 men and twenty-four artillery pieces available, supplemented by potential naval gunfire support. Yet only six rifle companies - approximately 1,250 men - actually occupied the front line along a canal front nearly nine kilometres wide.
All in all, on paper, the Franco-Dutch man and fire power was quite substantial in comparison to the canal region that had to be defended, particularly since the canal itself constituted a formidable obstacle. Roughly eighty metres wide and with all bridges destroyed, it could only be crossed by means of boats or improvised rafts, exposing any attacker to defensive fire.
During the night, several German assault parties quietly crossed the canal through the gaps between the French battalions. Once ashore, they concealed themselves behind French lines and awaited the main attack. The exact number of infiltrators remains unknown.
French historian Lerecouvreux later blamed the Dutch for these crossings, arguing that inadequate demolition of the bridges had facilitated the German advance. While two damaged crossings indeed remained usable to individual soldiers, this criticism misses the point. Most German infiltrators crossed elsewhere in small boats and rafts. The real issue was that the French guards along the canal failed to detect these crossings at all.
The infiltrators remained silent throughout the night and would later cause considerable disruption behind the French front. Their presence proved especially dangerous because the French positions lacked adequate flank protection and contained significant gaps between units.
That morning, General Deslaurens formally assumed command of the defence of Walcheren, replacing General Durand. Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the part on the south side of the Western Scheldt, remained under General Beaufrère's authority. Deslaurens quickly discovered the poor condition of the forces under his command. Many heavy weapons, including machine guns and mortars, had not yet arrived and would not reach Zeeland until the following day.
The command change reflected growing dissatisfaction among senior French officers. During a meeting on the evening of 15 May, many had openly criticised Durand's leadership and judgement. The decision was therefore taken by Platon to replace him. Had this change occurred several days earlier, it might have altered the course of events. By the morning of 16 May, however, it was already too late.
Deslaurens nevertheless remained cautiously optimistic. The canal appeared a strong defensive position, and additional Dutch forces occupied Noord-Beveland and nearby islands. The northern sector was also protected by the continued Dutch resistance on Tholen.
The Germans concentrated their assault forces in the north. This decision was dictated by geography. The flooded areas that had protected the Zanddijk Line narrowed the available deployment space in the southern sector, whereas the northern sector offered considerably more room for manoeuvre. Consequently, the reinforced 1st Battalion (Gruppe Witt) and 3rd Battalion (Gruppe Kleinheisterkamp) were assigned the main assault.
The first Allied action came during the night when the French naval patrol vessel Chasseur no. 41 opened fire on German machine-gun positions. At approximately 0330 hours, all three French Chasseurs joined the bombardment, expending most of their ammunition before withdrawing to Veere to rearm. One vessel, Chasseur no. 9, suffered serious mechanical engine trouble and was forced to proceed to Flushing for repairs.
Throughout the night, German artillery subjected Kapelle and its surroundings to intermittent shelling. Luftwaffe ground-attack aircraft appeared at first light. Although German artillery resources remained limited, the psychological effect was considerable. Several Dutch units behind the canal abandoned their positions almost immediately. Once again, officers frequently led the retreat, setting a poor example for their men.
The Luftwaffe's continued presence had a similarly corrosive effect on French morale. By 0700 hours, German infiltrators began harassing rear areas while artillery, mortars, and machine guns intensified their fire. Dutch countermeasures against the infiltrators were often poorly organised and rarely executed effectively.
Fearing inaccurate fire from their own artillery, French commanders ordered their frontline companies to withdraw several hundred metres from the canal. This decision unintentionally presented the Germans with a golden opportunity. With the immediate defences temporarily pulled back, German troops crossed the canal largely unopposed.
As alarming reports poured in, General Deslaurens personally visited the front. Upon his return, he famously remarked:
"Il n'y a pas un Boche à voir, mais c'est la panique." ["There is not a German in sight, yet panic reigns everywhere."]
His assessment was painfully accurate. Around 1100 hours, the entire northern sector of the canal defence collapsed. French troops streamed to the rear in disorder. Only a small detachment near the Postbrug continued fighting. When German assault troops attacked their position at 1300 hours, they too were eventually overwhelmed. Twelve French soldiers were killed defending their post to the last.
With the fall of this final strongpoint, the western bank of the canal was secured by the Germans.
Although the Germans encountered little difficulty in securing the canal crossings, the 68th Reconnaissance Group (68 GRDI) and the recently deployed III/271 RI offered determined resistance in and around the village of Kapelle. Indeed, the fiercest fighting of the entire Zeeland campaign took place here.
The French launched a series of counterattacks involving the reconnaissance battalion and the 9th, 10th, and 11th Companies of the 271st Infantry Regiment, attempting to contain and reverse the German penetrations around Kapelle. A relatively small number of French soldiers demonstrated what could be achieved with determination and effective leadership. The main road through Kapelle remained firmly contested, and intense close-quarters combat developed throughout the village streets.
Both French and German artillery supported their respective troops, while hand grenades were employed extensively in the fighting. Kapelle suffered heavily. By late afternoon, when the battle finally subsided, numerous buildings had been destroyed and the streets were littered with rubble, abandoned equipment, military supplies, and the dead and wounded of both sides.
German losses amounted to approximately thirty casualties, including nine men killed in action. French losses were considerably heavier. The defence of the canal sector and the fighting around Kapelle cost the French no fewer than eighty-four men killed, among them at least nine officers, including the chief of staff of the 271st Infantry Regiment, Commandant (Major) Pierre Bourgon, as well as two company commanders. The number of wounded is unknown but must have been substantial.
Meanwhile, German engineers established a ferry service across the canal, enabling the passage of light vehicles and motorised units. By approximately 1600 hours, armoured cars and motorcycle troops had begun crossing. Immediately thereafter, these units pressed westward toward the Sloe as rapidly as possible. Elements of 3./SS Reconnaissance Battalion (SS.AA) reached the Sloedam as early as the evening of 16 May.
To the west of the hard-fought Kapelle sector, pockets of resistance briefly emerged, but at every location they quickly collapsed. The Germans built considerable momentum during their advance and repeatedly smashed through improvised defensive positions, leaving follow-up units to eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance. Their objective was clear: if they could reach the Sloedam - the only land connection between Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren - before the retreating French and Dutch forces, they would cut off the defenders and trap them on the peninsula.
In many respects, it was a miniature Blitzkrieg.
Most Dutch units stationed around Goes succeeded in crossing the Sloedam or evacuating via the ferry to Noord-Beveland before nightfall. The French were far less fortunate. Of the approximately 3,500 French troops originally present, only about 700 managed to escape death or capture. Throughout the retreat, the Luftwaffe relentlessly harassed anyone attempting to cross the Sloedam. Once again, Allied fighter cover was conspicuously absent.
Apart from the roughly 700 men who escaped, most of the 271st Infantry Regiment was either captured or killed. The entire battalion of the 224th Infantry Regiment, which had defended the coastline immediately west of the canal, was cut off by the 1st Battalion of SS Regiment Deutschland, surrounded, and forced to surrender. A small company of Dutch railway troops stationed in Goes was also captured. The two Dutch battalions defending the southern coast of Zuid-Beveland found themselves trapped in the narrowing pocket and their surrender became only a matter of time.
By the end of the day, more than 3,000 Allied troops - most of them French - had fallen into German hands.
The devastation west of the canal testified to the intensity of the fighting. Although the heaviest combat had taken place around Kapelle, the nearby villages and hamlets of Biezelinge, Schore, and Wemeldinge also bore the scars of battle. German artillery bombardments and air attacks caused widespread destruction, damaging residential areas and claiming the lives of local civilians.
Meanwhile, French Rear Admiral Platon succeeded in securing the support of nine aircraft from AB2, a naval squadron capable of carrying 500-kilogram bombs. AB2 was equipped with the highly capable Stuka Ju-87 alike, gull-winged Loire-Nieuport LN.401 dive bombers. These aircraft conducted several attacks against German positions on Zuid-Beveland. Although their material impact was limited, their appearance provided a welcome boost to morale for troops who until then had witnessed little but unchallenged Luftwaffe activity overhead.
For the remainder of the day, however, German air superiority remained virtually uncontested. Allied anti-aircraft defences were sparse, and the Luftwaffe continued to operate with near impunity.
Colonel Guihard, having narrowly escaped capture in Goes, established a small bridgehead east of the Sloedam with the remnants of the 68th Reconnaissance Group and several smaller units. This position was soon detected by German motorised reconnaissance troops, but no immediate action followed, as the main German force was still advancing toward the Sloe.
At the same time, Allied naval units - including the French destroyers Cyclone and Siroco, together with the British destroyers HMS Wolsey and HMS Vimiera - opened fire on several locations where German troops were believed to be concentrated. According to German reports, these bombardments caused neither casualties nor material damage. Nevertheless, they likely reinforced the impression among the forward SS units that an immediate assault on the Sloedam would be hazardous.
SS-Oberführer Steiner therefore ordered his two leading battalions to prepare for a night attack instead ...
Elements of 3./SS.AA reached the approaches to the Sloedam late in the evening of 16 May. In addition to several armoured cars and motorcycle infantry, the reconnaissance detachment was supported by a platoon of anti-tank guns and a number of 81 mm mortars. With these limited resources, the SS reconnaissance troops launched an exploratory assault across the causeway.
The French had positioned several anti-tank guns at both ends of the Sloedam, covering the narrow approach. As a result, the leading German armoured car became an easy target. It was struck three times by the French Hotchkiss 25 mm anti-tank guns, mortally wounding one crewman and injuring the remaining three. When a second armoured car was also hit, the Germans promptly broke off the attack and withdrew. Both damaged vehicles were later recovered. The French, for their part, pulled back several hundred metres, abandoning two of their already scarce anti-tank guns.
SS-Oberführer Steiner was furious when he learned of the incident. He had not authorised the operation and considered the few armoured cars available to his regiment far too valuable to risk against what he regarded as an "unprepared" - that is, not yet softened-up - defensive position. His reaction was arguably excessive and somewhat opportunistic.
Indeed, it was precisely such unorthodox initiatives that had repeatedly enabled German forces to achieve rapid successes during the Westfeldzug (Western Campaign). Throughout the campaign, unexpected and often unauthorised assaults had caught Allied defenders off balance and produced decisive breakthroughs. Had the commander of 3./SS.AA succeeded in forcing the Sloedam, he would likely have been celebrated for his audacity rather than criticised for his recklessness. Such was often the double-edged nature of bold military leadership.
During the evening and throughout the night, German engineers constructed a heavy pontoon bridge across the canal east of Kapelle. This enabled the movement of artillery into western Zuid-Beveland. Four batteries, including at least one battery of 150 mm howitzers, were deployed near Lewedorp, approximately three kilometres east of the Sloedam. These were the same artillery units that had supported the fighting along the canal earlier that day. German sources suggest that one or two additional batteries may also have been brought forward, although the available evidence remains inconclusive.
General Deslaurens, meanwhile, moved quickly to organise the defence of the Sloedam. Once again, the terrain appeared favourable to the defender. The muddy waters of the Sloe formed a significant natural obstacle, allowing the defence to be concentrated on the narrow causeway itself.
The Sloedam was approximately 800 metres long and 40 metres wide, with no significant obstacles along its surface. French engineers used Dutch explosives to destroy a section of the railway track running across the dam. Deslaurens positioned two understrength battalions at the western end of the causeway, one behind the other, creating a modest defence in depth.
The remainder of the eastern shoreline of Walcheren was guarded by improvised detachments deployed along the coast and the western bank of the Sloe. Support was available from the twelve 75 mm guns of the French 89th Artillery Regiment.
Dutch artillery, however, had effectively ceased to exist as a meaningful force. Most of its equipment had either been captured by the Germans or had become unusable due to age and wear. Only two 105 mm field guns had been preserved and redeployed southwest of Middelburg, Zeeland's capital. Dutch participation in the defence of the Sloedam was limited. The only Dutch formation directly incorporated into Deslaurens' defensive plan was the 14th Reserve Border Infantry Company, which was deployed south of the causeway.
A further Dutch company remained at Flushing, where it formed a thin screening force northeast of the city. Most of the remaining Dutch troops on Walcheren had been concentrated in the western part of the island. By this stage, however, these formations were of little military value. Poor morale, inadequate leadership, and the events of the preceding days had rendered them largely ineffective as a fighting force..