The civil authorities in Zeeland, led by the Mayor of Middelburg, Walrave Boas de Bordes, displayed considerable foresight and a strong sense of responsibility when they decided to evacuate the province's two principal urban centres, Flushing and Middelburg.
The mayor had carefully followed developments during the preceding days and recognised the growing danger facing Walcheren. With increasing numbers of French troops concentrating on the island and reports indicating that German ground forces were rapidly approaching, he considered it only a matter of time before Zeeland became a major battlefield.
Anticipating the possibility of German air attacks and artillery bombardments against the island's population centres, particularly after what happened in sieged Rotterdam already in the days leading up to the 14th, De Bordes chose to act before events overtook the authorities. His decision reflected a clear understanding of the military situation and a determination to minimise civilian casualties should the fighting spread to Walcheren.
In hindsight, the evacuation order proved to be a prudent measure. The strategic importance of Zeeland and the continued arrival of Allied forces made it increasingly likely that the Germans would soon direct their attention towards the province. The civil authorities were among the first to recognise this reality and take practical steps to protect the civilian population from the consequences of the impending battle..
In the newspapers, the Mayor of Middelburg published an appeal urging the inhabitants of Middelburg and Flushing to leave their homes and seek refuge in the countryside, particularly in the western part of Walcheren. In the aftermath of the devastating events of previous German raids during the May war, there was little need to explain the reasoning behind the measure. The population understood all too well what was at stake, and many civilians had already left the cities in search of the relative safety of the rural areas.
The evacuation presented considerable logistical challenges. Unlike the pre-war evacuation plans prepared for the areas surrounding the Bath and Zanddijk Lines, this movement had to be organised at short notice and under wartime conditions. Moreover, the Dutch and French military authorities had requisitioned most available means of transport, including bicycles, motorbikes, horses, carts, cars, trucks, and buses. As a result, the majority of civilians were forced to make the journey on foot.
For a time, the rural districts of Walcheren became heavily congested. Refugees from Middelburg and Flushing joined the approximately 14,000 evacuees from the Bath Line and Zanddijk Line sectors, as well as some 4,000 Dutch soldiers who had retreated from North Brabant. Despite these difficulties, the mayor's advice would prove both prudent and justified in the days that followed.
Mayor De Bordes demonstrated further foresight by encouraging the island's Jewish residents to leave Zeeland and seek safety in Belgium or France. He feared for their future should the Germans eventually occupy the island. Tragically, only a small number chose to follow his recommendation. It would be unfair to judge those who remained. Few people in May 1940 could fully comprehend the scale of persecution and destruction that lay ahead. The horrors that would unfold during the five years of occupation were beyond the imagination of most contemporaries. Yet in retrospect, De Bordes' warnings stand as a remarkable example of early political insight and moral courage at a time when the future remained uncertain to almost everyone