In the morning the French 'Chef du Corps Expeditionnaire ,' Brigadier-General Mary Adrien Albin Durand (1882-1964), arrived at the headquarters of the Dutch Commander-in-Chief Zeeland [Rear-Admiral Van der Stad]. Durand had been appointed commander of the French forces in Zeeland. As commander of the French forces in Zeeland, Durand now had little choice but to coordinate operations with the Dutch command. It soon became clear to the Dutch, however, that effective coordination on equal terms and on the basis of mutual respect was out of the question with General Durand.
General Durand arrived on the morning of 11 May with a regiment from the 68th Infantry Division and a company from the 60th Infantry Division, supported by six 2.5 cm anti-aircraft guns. Together, these forces formed what would today be called a Quick Reaction Force, which Durand commanded under the title 'Chef du Corps Expeditionnaire '. The formation had departed France overnight aboard a number of mailboats and was escorted by Allied destroyers to ensure a safe passage to Flushing. General Durand had been assigned the overall command over the French formations in Zeeland by the office of the l'Amiral Nord. Prior to this appointment, Durand had served as commander of the infantry of the 68th Infantry Division. General Beaufrère remained the commander of 68.DI..
The General complained about the Dutch forces he had encountered on his way to the Dutch headquarters. In his view, their strength and condition fell far short of minimum requirements. He made it clear that he had been instructed by Platon to organise the defence of the northern Westerschelde sector, comprising Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. Rear Admiral Van der Stad accepted the French explanation regarding Durand’s authority, although he failed to verify it.
General Durand briefly stated that he intended to abandon the Dutch defence plan. He disagreed with virtually all of its underlying principles. Rear Admiral Van der Stad, for his part, attempted to convince the French commander that the plan - although modest in scope - had been carefully considered. It was clear that the two commanders were fundamentally at odds over the operational strategy.
Nevertheless, the Dutch Admiral transferred operational command of the Dutch troops on Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland to Durand. At first glance, this may appear a peculiar decision, but it was understandable given the circumstances and the lack of adequately equipped Dutch formations. The Dutch High Command had provided Van der Stad with no clear instructions regarding joint operations, let alone the question of executive command in Zeeland.
The French, for their part, appeared to hold a rather one-sided view of combined operations: if operations were to be “joint,” they would be conducted under French command, period. Since the French were about to deploy substantial organised formations on several of the Zeeland islands, Van der Stad considered it prudent, at least for the time being, to yield to the demands of his French counterpart.
Durand quickly gained a reputation as a grumpy, stubborn, and uncooperative ally. All Dutch officers present - and even some of the French - later testified to this impression. The General expressed fundamental doubts about the chosen defensive lines and regarded the inundations as entirely ineffective.
The Dutch had anticipated that a German assault would be concentrated on the Kreekrakdam, the main causeway running from east to west. Durand, however, was far from receptive to the idea that the Germans would launch their attack over land. Instead, he lectured his Dutch counterpart that it was far more likely the enemy would attempt an amphibious landing behind the defensive lines. Consequently, he informed the Dutch commander that the French troops would not reinforce the existing positions, but would instead deploy along the coastline of Zuid-Beveland.
In addition, Durand positioned his troops behind the canal, just west of the Dutch Zanddijk Line, which he considered a far stronger and more natural defensive position than the line the Dutch had established several kilometres east of the canal. The Dutch had abandoned this option a year earlier because the eastern dike of the canal was significantly higher than the western one. This would severely hamper the defenders, as they would have an inadequate view of the canal’s approaches.
It became increasingly clear that the French commander was directing operations from his map rather than from any understanding of the local terrain, and that he largely ignored the information provided by Dutch officers regarding the actual situation on the ground. Durand persisted in his conviction that the Dutch had made a grave error and maintained his orders accordingly.
He also redeployed one of the three Dutch infantry battalions from the Zanddijk Line to the northern coastline in anticipation of the German amphibious landings he expected. Furthermore, Durand ordered the Dutch to demolish all bridges over the canal as a precautionary measure, although the Dutch staff fortunately succeeded in preventing the execution of this plan.
Durand’s expectation of a German maritime operation demonstrated limited strategic insight. From the French perspective, such an operation would have had to be launched from the island of Tholen, which at the time was occupied only by a small Dutch force. The few light Dutch naval patrols operating in the wide Oosterschelde were, to some extent, militarily negligible. The more fundamental question, however, was how the Germans could realistically organise a large-scale amphibious assault when speed and simplicity were central to their operational doctrine and suitable landing craft were not readily available.
Moreover, the land route remained entirely open to the Germans and represented by far the simplest and most straightforward course of action. German operational practice generally favoured direct and uncomplicated offensives over more elaborate alternatives, unless a significant strategic surprise was required. In this case, the state of the Dutch defences posed little concern to German planners. A conventional land assault therefore made far more sense, particularly since the Germans were fully aware of the weakness of the Dutch forces in Zeeland.
That weakness was far less evident at sea, where no support from the Kriegsmarine was to be expected and where sufficient shipping for a major amphibious operation was lacking. In addition, the Germans considered themselves superior on land and had already secured air superiority over the Netherlands within the first hours of the campaign.
Interestingly, Durand’s reasoning also contained elements of contradiction. On the one hand, he dismissed the inundations as largely ineffective against an attacking force; on the other, he believed the Germans would opt for a far more complex and hazardous amphibious operation. Perhaps he assumed that the inundations would compel the Germans to outflank the defensive lines through a seaborne assault. The precise details of Durand’s reasoning remain unclear, however, and his assumptions were certainly open to debate.
With the benefit of hindsight, it can be concluded that Durand proved mistaken on virtually every point. At the time, however, the Dutch were greatly overawed by his pronounced self-confidence and stubborn determination. Since Durand’s executive command over the operations had been mandated by Platon, Rear Admiral Van der Stad had little choice but to accept it, and he and his staff complied accordingly.
While relations with General Durand were extremely poor, maritime cooperation between the French and Dutch forces was cordial from the outset.
The French commander of naval operations, Rear Admiral (upper half) [Contre-Amiral] Platon - and the Dutch Rear Admiral (lower half) Van der Stad worked together in a highly professional and cooperative manner. They were assisted by the French liaison officer Lieutenant-Commander Loranchet, a French officer on Platon’s staff who spoke Dutch fluently.
Although Platon continually travelled back and forth between Dunkirk and Flushing, coordination between the two Allied staffs proceeded smoothly. A particularly noteworthy meeting took place late in the evening of 11 May at Breskens between Platon and Brigadier General Maurice Frédéric Gaëtan Beaufrère, commander of the 68th Division. Beaufrère requested that Platon assume overall command of the French forces in Zeeland, as he considered Durand entirely unsuited to the task. Although this request had no immediate consequences, it demonstrates that the French themselves were also uneasy about the peculiar General Durand.
On 11 May, Brigadier General Deslaurens, commander of the 60th Division, also paid his first visit to the Dutch headquarters in Middelburg. Relations with this capable officer would later prove both cordial and highly valuable during the subsequent stages of the battle.